市场评论

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下面是九月八号Conference call 对市场评论的总结，贴出来，希望对大家有帮助。
. h# n0 [5 O: m2 Y& e/ v5 E1 a
9 `4 C5 e$ f: m2 g" y2 ^: j# gMarket Commentary
Eric Bushell, Chief Investment Officer
/ t; V, K) n  G; q% t& R9 {3 B- b( I. }James Dutkiewicz, Portfolio Manager
Signature Global Advisors


Background remarks
' ^+ o3 [# y! ^) p% ~ Governments’ costs associated with stabilizing the crisis, including recent government stimulus programs, are
as much as 20% or even 60% of GDP.
 Some governments have reached limits of sustainable debt loads and markets are beginning to insist on fiscal
% l3 ~1 ?# {7 P' @: y- p9 ?7 m- Xadjustments.
 This marks the beginning of what will be a turbulent social and political period, where elements of the social
safety nets in Western economies are no longer affordable and must be defunded.
3 P2 N$ i+ X( d2 l: t Templates for fiscal adjustment are appearing in peripheral and core Europe, the U.S. and elsewhere. There are
lessons to be learned from the frontrunners.
 We see policy interventions playing a bigger role in financial markets. Policymakers are trying to ease these
# t0 A; G4 _$ d! j5 _' L4 gadjustments for governments and consumers as they deleverage.
3 Q! l+ Q6 e! v5 y" D4 J6 i Policy interventions are shaping markets more than fundamentals. Examples include the U.S. Federal Reserve’s
* ?* v$ n3 D1 m$ Q& _( Qquantitative easing (QE2) program and the ECB intervention in the European sovereign bond market.
  C  B8 P  R7 i9 p9 s# n Developed financial markets have now priced in lower levels of economic growth.
 Credit markets are now less resilient to shocks because of Basel III and the Dodd-Frank bill. Brokers have
+ @' e* b' \8 o, h% a/ Dreduced capacity to hold risk. Therefore, risk shedding by others is going to have a greater impact.

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Current situation
 The lesson we learned from the 2008-2009 credit crunch is how credit markets affect stock valuations. As long
as funding markets stay open, equities are valued as going concerns. But if credit markets close, markets may
% d  s5 T: G  V' \impose liquidation values.
 In the summer, the European credit crisis caused another round of market worries about a credit shutdown. In
) V8 e1 W$ N# O: H( X) _/ K" L( DAugust, we said a credit shutdown was unlikely – we continue to hold that view.
 The collapse of interest rates on 10-year Treasuries to 2% leaves banks, insurance companies and pension
- S  n* `) ?% x" N6 V" Cscrambling for higher yields to satisfy their obligations – this is supportive of corporate bond markets.
$ i6 c6 X5 A8 T: }' I, {
4 o5 K! h$ z4 d  g) C# \" e+ SA look at credit markets
; e: t& c% q8 A$ g  Z( \ Investment grade – $17 billion in new issues were placed last Wednesday. We’re expecting $80-$100 billion in
' q# k0 T6 p, O! qSeptember. Non-financial investment grade is the new safe haven.
 High yield – In March, the spread above governments was 450 basis points, today it’s 740 bps. Yields were 7%
then, now they are 8.5%. New issuance has been about $30 billion a month, although August saw only $1
/ W1 M) P) i8 T0 K' J0 Zbillion. That said, the market is still open. Risk has been repriced – but appropriately priced issues still have
access to the market. There are only two parts of the global bond market having difficulty – ultra-low-grade
CCC issues and European high yield, which are both down about 2.5% year-to-date. All other bond markets are
9 V& K5 O9 h! o) Q' Gpositive for the year-do-date, including high yield.
 Mortgages – There is no funding for new construction, but existing quality properties are having no trouble
, y: q3 `/ [. l) I! ofinding financing.
 Commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) – In the summer, there were two failed transactions, but they
6 _& e, }! k/ Owere subsequently repriced and placed. In the fall, there will be more deals.
3 C! ]- D% F' @8 m0 J- @0 k Leveraged floating rate collateralized loans – The index was trading at $90 last September, $96 in March and
is now back to $90. Changes were a result of interest rate expectations (people thought that interest rates were
going up) rather than liquidity. Chapter 11 companies have no problem getting secured and when they file for
- f1 a4 `' z7 e/ G- \bankruptcy, they already have debt financing in place.
 European banks – European bank lending conditions are tighter. This is the weakest link in the financial chain
; v; K. g+ Q" ]2 atoday.
 Emerging markets – Sovereign rates have rallied along with U.S. Treasuries. High-grade corporates in
emerging markets have no problem with funding.

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European Union agenda
( a' B8 x, L) U! z Europe is frantic and will remain so for at least another four months – which is what we see as the timeline for
/ y9 g" T4 N# v# r4 s5 K( dthe Greek default.
 As we see it, the following firewalls need to be put in place:
9 D4 \2 W$ n0 _! R4 G- M! f  i1. Making sure that banks have enough capital and deposit insurance to survive a Greek default
5 f- l- ^) c& N8 s: x7 q# |2. The European Financial Stability Facility, which is to be used for the bank capital injection and sovereign
debt stabilization, needs government approvals.
+ A1 R8 ^! w7 d3. Measures of assistance to help European banks to make $1.7 trillion in refinancing easier and allowing
- w! _& }/ l$ y4 z1 l$ u+ Mbanks to shrink their balance sheets over three years
4. More fiscal reform for Spain, Italy and France is a precondition for stable sovereign debt markets.
3 e2 }6 ^3 y, B! Q% w+ V" s
. o; o6 `( S4 u6 B1 fBeyond Greece
, J0 b3 H# q2 k The EFSF #2 plan announced in July was a toolkit to deal with the PIGS (Portugal, Ireland, Greece and Spain),
but that was before Italy.
 It provided a $500-billion loan program, but $250 billion was already spoken for by the PIGS.
0 c( P3 f9 `5 Q2 D7 i It’s an undersized framework and if negative growth/interest rate dynamics keep investors from sponsoring the
  d) a' _1 G+ ~- Y! S8 O/ nItalian bond market, the EU crisis will escalate further.

Conclusion
 We want to have safeguards in place and continue to be liquid, so that we can capitalize on future turbulence.

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