市场评论

小曲

下面是九月八号Conference call 对市场评论的总结，贴出来，希望对大家有帮助。
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1 w' l4 v1 N8 z4 J' \Market Commentary
/ N* X- a5 K/ t( p: A/ KEric Bushell, Chief Investment Officer
James Dutkiewicz, Portfolio Manager
+ ~4 O- n2 N0 I  m: }- RSignature Global Advisors

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Background remarks
 Governments’ costs associated with stabilizing the crisis, including recent government stimulus programs, are
/ w: {$ k8 l" r7 P9 sas much as 20% or even 60% of GDP.
 Some governments have reached limits of sustainable debt loads and markets are beginning to insist on fiscal
& j9 X+ y2 T0 H* `' ~adjustments.
 This marks the beginning of what will be a turbulent social and political period, where elements of the social
! w3 N1 p7 q, X1 tsafety nets in Western economies are no longer affordable and must be defunded.
 Templates for fiscal adjustment are appearing in peripheral and core Europe, the U.S. and elsewhere. There are
lessons to be learned from the frontrunners.
) E# D8 I/ N4 Z, q6 m We see policy interventions playing a bigger role in financial markets. Policymakers are trying to ease these
9 p6 ^; j% B0 U+ D5 ^, d9 ^adjustments for governments and consumers as they deleverage.
 Policy interventions are shaping markets more than fundamentals. Examples include the U.S. Federal Reserve’s
quantitative easing (QE2) program and the ECB intervention in the European sovereign bond market.
 Developed financial markets have now priced in lower levels of economic growth.
/ B2 V2 I5 ^9 d' B' n/ ?" _ Credit markets are now less resilient to shocks because of Basel III and the Dodd-Frank bill. Brokers have
- l1 {7 n: |+ O* X/ @4 ureduced capacity to hold risk. Therefore, risk shedding by others is going to have a greater impact.

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Current situation
 The lesson we learned from the 2008-2009 credit crunch is how credit markets affect stock valuations. As long
8 ^0 {& l( n' t( ]  V2 {6 mas funding markets stay open, equities are valued as going concerns. But if credit markets close, markets may
impose liquidation values.
9 @! M# c- W& `0 ^. J2 r In the summer, the European credit crisis caused another round of market worries about a credit shutdown. In
August, we said a credit shutdown was unlikely – we continue to hold that view.
. i/ ^% l) f- g3 v+ U: X% r The collapse of interest rates on 10-year Treasuries to 2% leaves banks, insurance companies and pension
* U' }+ v9 y0 R8 V' nscrambling for higher yields to satisfy their obligations – this is supportive of corporate bond markets.

A look at credit markets
3 D0 _% a) m1 e. ?* i/ z7 N Investment grade – $17 billion in new issues were placed last Wednesday. We’re expecting $80-$100 billion in
' x) v3 E4 F  b# U5 G5 h, z. W) jSeptember. Non-financial investment grade is the new safe haven.
5 p( A6 \+ }. ~/ j- P  E2 r+ t7 Z9 ~ High yield – In March, the spread above governments was 450 basis points, today it’s 740 bps. Yields were 7%
then, now they are 8.5%. New issuance has been about $30 billion a month, although August saw only $1
; m! R0 {/ @" h$ k) w( M* U* P: dbillion. That said, the market is still open. Risk has been repriced – but appropriately priced issues still have
9 u2 \& A! D$ Z" raccess to the market. There are only two parts of the global bond market having difficulty – ultra-low-grade
CCC issues and European high yield, which are both down about 2.5% year-to-date. All other bond markets are
& L/ j/ g& W/ o) S2 qpositive for the year-do-date, including high yield.
( t# a/ ~$ ]  i Mortgages – There is no funding for new construction, but existing quality properties are having no trouble
5 J9 E) F% l. o; dfinding financing.
 Commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) – In the summer, there were two failed transactions, but they
/ u# k; \5 B. F- p! T# ^were subsequently repriced and placed. In the fall, there will be more deals.
 Leveraged floating rate collateralized loans – The index was trading at $90 last September, $96 in March and
8 N4 o4 c. |3 Ris now back to $90. Changes were a result of interest rate expectations (people thought that interest rates were
1 k$ b9 B2 e' cgoing up) rather than liquidity. Chapter 11 companies have no problem getting secured and when they file for
bankruptcy, they already have debt financing in place.
 European banks – European bank lending conditions are tighter. This is the weakest link in the financial chain
today.
% @" R" p  _6 K5 b' J Emerging markets – Sovereign rates have rallied along with U.S. Treasuries. High-grade corporates in
emerging markets have no problem with funding.

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European Union agenda
 Europe is frantic and will remain so for at least another four months – which is what we see as the timeline for
2 `  p4 P6 T/ i5 y& M; n4 Dthe Greek default.
 As we see it, the following firewalls need to be put in place:
( ^+ M5 Y" o5 c; q) ]) I4 ^5 O7 B1. Making sure that banks have enough capital and deposit insurance to survive a Greek default
1 d, [7 f, |) d1 r9 |2. The European Financial Stability Facility, which is to be used for the bank capital injection and sovereign
& J2 A3 Y# r0 w6 l1 N+ z* r8 ]# O$ Cdebt stabilization, needs government approvals.
3. Measures of assistance to help European banks to make $1.7 trillion in refinancing easier and allowing
7 p: ]; V1 r" G9 V9 ibanks to shrink their balance sheets over three years
4. More fiscal reform for Spain, Italy and France is a precondition for stable sovereign debt markets.

Beyond Greece
 The EFSF #2 plan announced in July was a toolkit to deal with the PIGS (Portugal, Ireland, Greece and Spain),
but that was before Italy.
* U4 w1 f4 E0 u6 a9 |" T. E It provided a $500-billion loan program, but $250 billion was already spoken for by the PIGS.
 It’s an undersized framework and if negative growth/interest rate dynamics keep investors from sponsoring the
Italian bond market, the EU crisis will escalate further.
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4 \  k4 t6 y; h, x- }Conclusion
 We want to have safeguards in place and continue to be liquid, so that we can capitalize on future turbulence.

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