市场评论

小曲

下面是九月八号Conference call 对市场评论的总结，贴出来，希望对大家有帮助。
4 Q4 k1 q  Y% c, D
Market Commentary
1 n/ b5 s$ G  i! r' s8 K# DEric Bushell, Chief Investment Officer
James Dutkiewicz, Portfolio Manager
( o9 Q6 G$ `9 K9 C1 NSignature Global Advisors


) T& _. ~9 L# z. Y8 L1 \Background remarks
4 r' X+ n3 {& z6 O Governments’ costs associated with stabilizing the crisis, including recent government stimulus programs, are
$ h. n6 t% ^: o  qas much as 20% or even 60% of GDP.
 Some governments have reached limits of sustainable debt loads and markets are beginning to insist on fiscal
: n4 S" c2 F5 P4 ]' X; Y( xadjustments.
 This marks the beginning of what will be a turbulent social and political period, where elements of the social
+ I' _- ^. r" P& `- M2 psafety nets in Western economies are no longer affordable and must be defunded.
 Templates for fiscal adjustment are appearing in peripheral and core Europe, the U.S. and elsewhere. There are
$ z$ D' Z/ e$ @3 K5 y4 \  Hlessons to be learned from the frontrunners.
8 e* j7 L- r1 _* q# H! q, x2 s We see policy interventions playing a bigger role in financial markets. Policymakers are trying to ease these
( `5 P+ c1 ~3 ]0 f, r8 b- p) Hadjustments for governments and consumers as they deleverage.
 Policy interventions are shaping markets more than fundamentals. Examples include the U.S. Federal Reserve’s
" f' ]* y8 B* s# o% oquantitative easing (QE2) program and the ECB intervention in the European sovereign bond market.
 Developed financial markets have now priced in lower levels of economic growth.
 Credit markets are now less resilient to shocks because of Basel III and the Dodd-Frank bill. Brokers have
reduced capacity to hold risk. Therefore, risk shedding by others is going to have a greater impact.

小曲

Current situation
1 h8 e! B. C' ~6 \8 n6 \ The lesson we learned from the 2008-2009 credit crunch is how credit markets affect stock valuations. As long
as funding markets stay open, equities are valued as going concerns. But if credit markets close, markets may
+ m" j; [. L$ Timpose liquidation values.
1 r! e2 t5 k! Y In the summer, the European credit crisis caused another round of market worries about a credit shutdown. In
5 C8 X# Z: ^  UAugust, we said a credit shutdown was unlikely – we continue to hold that view.
/ j, s. A1 ?% c0 ] The collapse of interest rates on 10-year Treasuries to 2% leaves banks, insurance companies and pension
scrambling for higher yields to satisfy their obligations – this is supportive of corporate bond markets.

A look at credit markets
 Investment grade – $17 billion in new issues were placed last Wednesday. We’re expecting $80-$100 billion in
September. Non-financial investment grade is the new safe haven.
1 V5 z2 ~; N/ m; f% @: x+ ?6 O; u, b9 q High yield – In March, the spread above governments was 450 basis points, today it’s 740 bps. Yields were 7%
0 H! k- O6 B$ w! c; V: _then, now they are 8.5%. New issuance has been about $30 billion a month, although August saw only $1
billion. That said, the market is still open. Risk has been repriced – but appropriately priced issues still have
access to the market. There are only two parts of the global bond market having difficulty – ultra-low-grade
& G/ z% s# ?# t" j9 O$ @CCC issues and European high yield, which are both down about 2.5% year-to-date. All other bond markets are
positive for the year-do-date, including high yield.
 Mortgages – There is no funding for new construction, but existing quality properties are having no trouble
7 i6 X( j" A- D- |finding financing.
- ^: R0 ^8 m' M* q2 b) X; [ Commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) – In the summer, there were two failed transactions, but they
were subsequently repriced and placed. In the fall, there will be more deals.
( k! e) e% O5 C' O- { Leveraged floating rate collateralized loans – The index was trading at $90 last September, $96 in March and
is now back to $90. Changes were a result of interest rate expectations (people thought that interest rates were
/ }2 \% J. Z) t) [1 F. ]going up) rather than liquidity. Chapter 11 companies have no problem getting secured and when they file for
bankruptcy, they already have debt financing in place.
/ _, a& M# [3 f  f European banks – European bank lending conditions are tighter. This is the weakest link in the financial chain
today.
 Emerging markets – Sovereign rates have rallied along with U.S. Treasuries. High-grade corporates in
emerging markets have no problem with funding.

小曲

European Union agenda
 Europe is frantic and will remain so for at least another four months – which is what we see as the timeline for
the Greek default.
  W0 v4 S2 y/ m, F5 n/ w As we see it, the following firewalls need to be put in place:
1. Making sure that banks have enough capital and deposit insurance to survive a Greek default
6 i; d- K" A# Y/ G& W7 d  s* E2. The European Financial Stability Facility, which is to be used for the bank capital injection and sovereign
debt stabilization, needs government approvals.
6 ~9 j2 `$ T8 y$ R3. Measures of assistance to help European banks to make $1.7 trillion in refinancing easier and allowing
banks to shrink their balance sheets over three years
, ^% g0 F0 {. |+ Z3 L4. More fiscal reform for Spain, Italy and France is a precondition for stable sovereign debt markets.

Beyond Greece
1 k+ D& P4 e4 I+ }) ^ The EFSF #2 plan announced in July was a toolkit to deal with the PIGS (Portugal, Ireland, Greece and Spain),
but that was before Italy.
0 ~) Y7 _; i0 b, X3 Z% R4 F It provided a $500-billion loan program, but $250 billion was already spoken for by the PIGS.
. a& [  t( u. N2 Q& t9 r( ` It’s an undersized framework and if negative growth/interest rate dynamics keep investors from sponsoring the
Italian bond market, the EU crisis will escalate further.
; y) a7 Q2 R7 K1 z
Conclusion
 We want to have safeguards in place and continue to be liquid, so that we can capitalize on future turbulence.

yuz967

kasnkan